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ABSTRACT

The IEEE 802.15.4 has attracted time-critical applications in wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) because of its beacon-enabled mode and guaranteed timeslots (GTSs). However,
the GTS scheme’s security still leave the 802.15.4 MAC vulnerable to attacks. Further, the
existing techniques in the literature for securing 802.15.4 either focus on non beacon-enabled
802.15.4 or cannot defend against insider attacks for beacon-enabled 802.15.4. In this thesis,
we illustrate this by demonstrating attacks on the availability and integrity of the beaconenabled 802.15.4. To proof the attacks, we implement the attacks using Tmote Sky motes
for a malicious node along with regular nodes. We show that the malicious node can freely
exploit the beacon frames to compromise the integrity and availability of the network. For
the defense, we present beacon-enabled MiniSec (BCN-MiniSec) and analyze its cost.
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have emerged quickly and attracted a number of diverse applications. The use of these applications ranges from residential to government. For
example, AlertMe home monitoring [1] is a residential system that enables secure indoor
and outdoor home environment monitoring with simple contact and passive infrared (PIR)
sensors. If AlertMe detects intruders, it immediately reports the intrusion to the homeowner.
The military is also using WSNs to detect an adversary’s behavior and location. For example, seismic sensors can be used to detect the movement of heavy artillery (e.g., tanks) in
the battlefield. In either case, not receiving information about the environment in a timesensitive manner can have significant consequences. To provide support for time-sensitive
communication, the IEEE 802.15.4 standard provides a beacon-enabled mode. Unlike non
beacon-enabled mode, the beacon-enabled mode in a 802.15.4 network employs a few end
device nodes and a centralized node (i.e., personal area network (PAN) coordinator) which
broadcasts beacons to synchronize the nodes in the network, manages guaranteed timeslots
(GTS) (de)allocation requests from the nodes, and assigns dedicated slots for transmissions
of the nodes through beacons. The beacon broadcast and GTS management scheme are
the most critical parts of real-time delivery of time-sensitive data during the contention
free period (CFP) [2–7]. Many researchers have focused on improving the performance or
energy efficiency of beacon-enabled 802.15.4 MAC and the use of its GTS scheme. For example, the IPP-HURRY research group has analyzed the delay bound of GTS allocations
to maximize the throughput of each GTS allocation for real-time sensor networks [3, 4]. In

2
addition, in [5] the authors present a case study of Siemens Industry Automation Division
that requires real-time delivery of short alarms/messages. The case study evaluates GTS
allocation to maximize low latency of its scheme. Although there has been a significant emphasis on improving the performance of beacon-enabled 802.15.4 networks, there has been
little work on securing them. This is significant, given that the GTS management scheme of
the PAN coordinator does not verify the ID of each node that requests GTSs. Further the
nodes in the network do not validate the PAN coordinator that broadcasts beacons. Therefore, an inside attacker can easily compromise the guaranteed data transmissions from the
time-sensitive applications in the beacon-enabled 802.15.4 network by either impersonating
legitimate nodes (existing in the PAN or not) or the PAN coordinator (e.g., implement a
Sybil attack [8] at the MAC layer).
In this thesis, we demonstrate six attacks that are possible by an inside attacker in
a beacon-enabled 802.15.4 network. The inside attacker targets the vulnerabilities of the
beacon broadcast and the GTS management scheme. The contributions of this thesis include
the discovery of vulnerable properties of the beacon-enabled mode in the IEEE 802.15.4
standard and the implementation and analysis of six potential insider attacks associated
with those vulnerabilities. We also present an extension of MiniSec [9], beacon-enabled
MiniSec (BCN-MiniSec), to defend against these attacks and examine its cost.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. We review some related works including
several security protocols for WSNs and attacks on beacon-enabled IEEE 802.15.4 in Chapter
2. In Chapter 3, we briefly illustrate the beacon broadcast and the GTS management scheme
and explain their vulnerabilities. In Chapter 4, we present the experiment design and show
the hardware and software components. In Chapter 5, we first define an attack model and
present an overview of the six attacks against the vulnerabilities. In Chapter 6, we describe
the implementation of the attacks. In Chapter 7, we show the analysis of each attack’s results
based on the captured data. We present BCN-MiniSec to defend against these attacks in
Chapter 8 and conclude our work in Chapter 9.
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Chapter 2

RELATED WORK

In this chapter we categorize current 802.15.4 defense mechanisms into non beaconenabled mode and beacon-enabled mode according to the literature and highlight their limitations. We also discuss the difference between our attacks on beacon-enabled 802.15.4
networks and others previously demonstrated.

2.1

Defense Mechanisms in Beacon-Less Mode
In [10, 11], the authors propose using the received signal strength indication (RSSI) to

identify nodes conducting a Sybil attack. The basic idea of RSSI-based methods is that
sensor nodes at different locations can be differentiated by the different RSSIs. In [10], M.
Demirbas et al. calculate the ratio of RSSIs to improve traditional RSSI-based solutions.
In [11], J. Yang et al. propose K-means cluster analysis that can be applied to RSSI readings.
However, RSSI-based solutions can be evaded by malicious nodes with mobility. Another approach to securing beacon-less 802.15.4 networks focuses on the use of cryptography. In [12]
the authors propose light-weight identity certificates to distinguish between legitimate nodes
and malicious nodes using multiple stolen or forged IDs, while the authors of [13–16] focus
on key distribution and management algorithms to provide this protection. However, it is
not practical for resource constrained sensor devices to use highly expensive key distribution
methods. Link layer security protocols constitute another category of defense mechanisms
for beacon-less 802.15.4 networks. SPINS, TinySec, and MiniSec [9, 17, 18] fall in this category and are designed specifically for energy constrained sensor nodes and provide data
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authentication and confidentiality in the link layer. However, these protocols are susceptible
to failures when a malicious node in the network (e.g., a compromised node or a malicious
insider) acquires a shared pair-wise key or a network-wide secret key. Moreover, even if their
shortcomings are excluded, none of the aforementioned schemes can be directly applied to
beacon-enabled 802.15.4 networks. This is because in addition to the data protection provided by the aforementioned schemes, beacon-enabled mode control messages (e.g., beacon
broadcasts from the PAN coordinator) must also be secured, and as pointed out by Perrig et
al. in [17], traditional data authentication techniques cannot be used to provide broadcast
beacon authentication.

2.2

Defense Mechanisms in Beacon-Enabled Mode
Few defense methods have been proposed for beacon-enabled mode. One RSSI-based

solution for beacon-enabled mode was proposed by F. Amini et al. in [19]. The authors
proposed an RSSI solution where they introduced the use of a disc number and a device ID.
However, if a malicious node is close enough to a legitimate node in the same PAN (i.e., an
inside attacker), its RSSI may be confused with the RSSI of the legitimate node. The IEEE
802.15.4 standard [20] also has built-in security mechanisms to provide data confidentiality
and data authenticity. However, in [21], N. Sastry et al. point out that these security
mechanisms have vulnerabilities related to the initialization vector (IV) management, key
management, and integrity protection. Moreover, the security mechanism only guarantees
data authentication, not authentication for beacon broadcasts. Alim et al. introduce EAPSens in [22], which provides entity authentication and key management to validate each
device ID with the extensible authentication protocol (EAP) [23] using EAP-generalized preshared keys (EAP-GPSKs) [24]. However, EAP-Sens uses the built-in security mechanisms of
the 802.15.4 standard to secure the communication between nodes and the PAN coordinator,
which means that it has the same problems as the security mechanisms in the 802.15.4
standard. Overall, neither the aforementioned detection mechanisms nor secure link layer
protocols for the beacon-enabled mode are effective in the case of inside attackers.
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2.3

Attacks on Beacon-Enabled 802.15.4 Networks
In [25], R. Sokullu et al. use ns-2 simulations to demonstrate GTS attacks on the

802.15.4 MAC, particularly in beacon-enabled mode. The GTS attacks were divided into
four different scenarios: One Intelligent Attacker (OIA), One Random Attacker (ORA), Two
Intelligent Attackers (TIAs), and Two Random Attackers (TRAs). Both the OIA and TIAs
scenarios target the maximum number of GTS slots assigned to one legitimate node. In
contrast, the ORA and TRAs scenarios attack just one randomly chosen GTS. The main
goal of the GTS attacks in [25] is to create collisions during the CFP to deny the use of GTSs.
In contrast, the six attacks that we present seek to exploit the beacon-enabled 802.15.4 MAC
by inducing scenarios of unfairness and exhaustion [26, 27].
In addition to presenting different types of attacks compared to those discussed in [25],
we implemented our attacks on real devices (i.e., Tmote Sky motes) rather than in simulation.
This latter point is extremely important for 802.15.4 MAC layer attacks, because in addition to the challenge of accurately modeling physical layer interference, simulations do not
take into account constraints imposed by the hardware, operating system, and applications,
which can lead to simplified attack scenarios. This is especially pronounced in resourceconstrained devices (e.g., Tmote Sky motes). For example, to implement the Sybil attack
(at the MAC layer) in TinyOS, we modified the timer function of TinyOS (in TimerC.nc)
to make it multithreaded so each fake node could use an instance. Each instance now has to
compete internally (within TinyOS) to gain access to the node’s resources (e.g., processor,
transceiver), making this attack much more difficult to conduct. This small, but noticeable
nuance is not present in simulation tools.
In [28] we introduced several attacks on the beacon-enabled 802.15.4 network. This work
extends [28] with the addition of 3 new implemented attacks as well as the presentation of
BCN-MiniSec to defend against the attacks.

6

Chapter 3

PROBLEM STATEMENT

In this chapter, we briefly explain the beacon broadcast and the GTS management
scheme of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. Additionally, we state the vulnerabilities of these
schemes.

3.1

Beacon Broadcasts
The IEEE 802.15.4 standard [20] operating in beacon-enabled mode defines the su-

perframe (SF) that consists of a contention access period (CAP), a contention free period
(CFP), and an inactive period as shown in Figure 3.1. The active period of the CAP and
the CFP is divided into 16 timeslots during which the nodes in the network should synchronize with and transmit data. The timeslots can be synchronized through beacons that
the personal area network (PAN) coordinator periodically transmits at intervals defined by
the macBeaconOrder value. Upon receiving the beacons, the nodes take the beacon order
(BO) and SF order (SO) from the SF specification field in Figure 3.2 (b) and synchronize
the timeslot interval, SF duration (SD), and beacon interval (BI) to the SF of the PAN in
Figure 3.1.
Beacon

CAP

0

1

Beacon

Maximum 7 GTSs

2

3

4

5

CFP

6

7

8

9

Inactive

10 11 12 13 14 15

SD=aBaseSuperframeDuration *2 S O symbols (Active)
BI=aBaseSuperframeDuration *2 B O symbols (Superframe structure with Inactive period)

Figure 3.1. The superframe structure of beacon-enabled 802.15.4.
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(a) Beacon frame structure
Bits

4

4

4

Beacon Order (BO)

Superframe Order
(SO)

Final CAP Slot

1

1

Battery Life
Reserved
Extension (BLE)

1

1

PAN
coordinator

Association
Permit

(b) Superframe Specification
24

Bits

3

4

1

7

1

GTS Descriptor
Counter

Reserv
ed

GTS
Permit

GTS Direction
Mask

Rese
rved

16
Device Short
Address

24

4

GTS
GTS
Starting
Length
Slot

For node N in GTS List Subfield
Octets

1
GTS Specification

0 or 1

variable

GTS Direction

GTS List

24

4
…

For other nodes
in GTS List Subfield

(c) GTS field

Figure 3.2. The beacon frame structure of the beacon-enabled 802.15.4 in detail: (a) beacon
frame structure (b) SF specification structure, and (b) GTS field structure in beacon frame.

3.2

Vulnerability of Beacon Broadcasts

Verification of the PAN coordinator: The two important values, BO and SO, can cause
the nodes to change their internal timers used for synchronization and transmitting messages.
However, when processing the beacons received, legitimate nodes do not authenticate the
beacons and cannot tell whether they really came from the PAN coordinator. The nodes only
confirm that the PAN ID in the packet is the same as the value used during bootstrapping
of the network. Thus, if a malicious node sends beacons with the same PAN ID, the nodes
process the malicious beacons the same as those from the PAN coordinator as shown in
Figure 3.3. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the data authentication of the standard does not
apply to beacon broadcasts.
3.3

GTS Management Scheme
The beacon frames contain the guaranteed timeslots (GTSs) information and directions

used by nodes to transmit data during the CFP. The structure of the beacon frame and the
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Malicious node
[PAN ID: 0x1234, ID: 0x0
BO 4, SO 2]

[PAN ID: 0x1234, ID: 0x0
BO 6, SO 3]

Re-synchronize BO 4, SO 2
after synchronizing BO 6, SO 3

Legitimate node A
[PAN ID: 0x1234, ID: 0x0
BO 4, SO 2]

PAN coordinator

Re-synchronize BO 4, SO 2
after synchronizing BO 6, SO 3

[PAN ID: 0x1234, ID: 0x0
BO 6, SO 3]

Legitimate node B

Beacons from the PAN coordinator
Beacons from the malicious node with the same PAN ID and
ID and different BO and SO

Figure 3.3. A malicious node impersonating the PAN coordinator and broadcasting false
BO and SO with the same PAN ID and the PAN coordinator’s ID.

GTS field are shown in Figure 3.2 (a) and (c) respectively.
As shown in Figure 3.1, the PAN coordinator defines that each SF can have a maximum of seven GTSs for the CFP other than aM inCAP Length in [20]. The GTSs must
be assigned to legitimate nodes issuing GTS allocation requests to the PAN coordinator.
Then, the assigned slots should be released by the PAN coordinator after receiving a GTS
deallocation request from the same legitimate node. We briefly explain the normal GTS
allocation and deallocation processes below.

GTS Allocation: If a legitimate node has data to transmit, it generates a GTS allocation request. The PAN coordinator will allocate an available GTS to the legitimate node,
and all subsequent beacon frames will contain the GTS descriptor defining the device address, GTS slot and direction. Upon receiving the beacon with the GTS descriptor, the
legitimate node will schedule the pending packet to be transmitted at the allocated GTS.
The GTS allocation process is shown in Figure 3.4 (a).

GTS Deallocation: The GTS deallocation occurs after the GTS descriptor has been
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transmitted for aGT SDescP ersistenceT ime beacons by the PAN coordinator or when the
legitimate node using the GTS sends an explicit GTS deallocation request. The GTS deallocation process is shown in Figure 3.4 (b).

Figure 3.4. GTS allocation and deallocation procedure.

3.4

Vulnerabilities of GTS Management Scheme
The PAN coordinator manages a list of GTSs to control the network access during the

CFP. However, the GTS management scheme has the following vulnerabilities.

CAP Maintenance: According to the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, the PAN coordinator can
perform several preventative actions to keep aM inCAP Length. One of these actions is to
deallocate unused GTSs within every 2∗n SFs, where n is defined as either 2(8−macBeaconOrder)
(0 ≤ macBeaconOrder ≤ 8) or (9 ≤ macBeaconOrder ≤ 14). However, if a malicious node
keeps constantly sending either GTS requests or data at the assigned GTSs during the CFP,
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the preventative action is ineffective.

Verification of Sensor Nodes’ IDs: In the 802.15.4 GTS management scheme, the
PAN coordinator manages the identities of legitimate nodes requesting one or more GTSs.
The PAN coordinator assigns GTSs to the nodes, deallocates the assigned slots, and avoids
duplicated GTS requests from the same legitimate node. However, as shown in Figure 3.5
the PAN coordinator only checks the sensor nodes’ IDs (a short 2-octet address) and the
sequence number of the packets. Thus, a malicious node can easily evade the verification
process for sensor nodes’ IDs by using new forged IDs or impersonating legitimate nodes in
the network.

Figure 3.5. A malicious node impersonating legitimate nodes A and B IDs.
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Chapter 4

EXPERIMENT DESIGN

In this chapter, we present a network design and hardware and software components
used for the experiments and implementation.

4.1

Network Design
In this thesis, we deploy wireless sensor nodes supporting the IEEE 802.15.4 standard

and its beacon-enabled mode. In general, the beacon-enabled 802.15.4 network consists
of few groups of clusters. One cluster can be composed of one PAN coordinator and few
nodes. For the experiments, we arrange a small cluster that consists of one PAN coordinator
and three nodes including a malicious node. The PAN coordinator broadcasts beacons and
receives sensed data from the nodes. The nodes sense the temperature and humidity around
the experiment area and transmit the data to the PAN coordinator during the CAP or the
CFP. The nodes do not communicate with one another, but only with the PAN coordinator
(e.g., a unicast message transmission). Only four nodes were used because the open source
implementation used became unstable with more than four nodes in the network. However,
it is important to note that these attacks are independent of the number of nodes deployed
in the network.

4.2

Hardware and Software Components
We used four Tmote Sky motes [29] based on TelosB platform: one for PAN coordinator,

two for legitimate nodes, and one for the malicious node. In addition, we used the Texas In-
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struments (TI) CC2420 Evaluation Board/Evaluation Module (EB/EM) [30] in conjunction
with the TI Chipcon packet sniffer [31] to capture and analyze packet traffic in the network.
For the attack implementation, we used a 802.15.4 open source supporting a beacon-enabled
mode from Open-ZB [32]. In particular, we used the open source v1.2 in conjunction with
TinyOS v1.15 [33]. Figure 4.1 shows Tmote Sky motes and CC2420 EB/EM. Figure 4.2
shows examples of captured packets from the TI Chipcon packet sniffer.

PAN coordinator
MN4
CC2420 EB/EM

Tmote Sky motes

LN2

Figure 4.1. Tmote Sky motes and CC2420 EB/EM.

LN6

Figure 4.2. Captured packets from TI Chipcon packet sniffer.

Generated from MN4

All GTSs used from the next superframes
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Chapter 5

OVERVIEW OF ATTACKS

In this chapter, we introduce the attack model and illustrate the overview of the attacks
based on the model. We present a total of six attacks and categorize them according to the
characteristics of the attacks. Table 5.1 lists the attacks and their characteristics.

5.1

Attack Model
Similar to the threat models defined in [26] and [34], we assume that a malicious node

behaves badly as a mote-class, inside, and active attacker. We deploy one Tmote Sky mote
as a malicious node that has the same capabilities as the legitimate nodes. The malicious
node is located near legitimate nodes in the beacon-enabled 802.15.4 network. The malicious
node listens to beacons from the PAN coordinator to get synchronization information of the
network and GTS (de)allocation requests from legitimate nodes in the passive phase. In the
active phase, since an authentication between legitimate nodes and the PAN coordinator
may not be present due to higher communication cost, it is easier for the malicious node to
impersonate either legitimate nodes or the PAN coordinator and to attack the vulnerabilities
of the beacon broadcasts and the GTS management scheme. Table 5.1 presents a summary
of the attacks and the vulnerabilities of the beacon-enabled 802.15.4 MAC.

Existing node IDs

Data (LN → PC)
GTS allocation
request (LN →
PC)

False data injection

DoS of GTS requests

Stealing network bandwidth

Non-existing node IDs

Existing PAN coordinator

Beacon (LN ← PC)

Existing node IDs

Impersonating the
PAN coordinator

DoS of data
transmission

GTS allocation request (LN → PC)

Existing PAN coordinator

Beacon (LN ← PC)

Synchronization attack

Impersonating a legitimate node

Node impersonated

Unauthenticated
Message
(Direction)

Attacks

GTS management
scheme

Beacon broadcast

Vulnerabilities

Unicast

Broadcast

Message transmission types

Table 5.1. Attacks and Their Characteristics. LN is legitimate nodes. PC is the PAN coordinator.
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5.2

Impersonating Existing Identities in the PAN
In this category, we describe four attacks. The first attack presented is the synchro-

nization attack. In this attacks, legitimate nodes are lead to synchronize their SF timeslots
with the manipulated beacons from the malicious node. The next two attacks block data
transmission from legitimate nodes in the PAN that want to gain GTSs and transmit timesensitive data in the slots. The fourth attack injects false sensed data into the traffic stream
from the legitimate node to the PAN coordinator during the CFP.
5.2.1

Synchronization Attack

This attack influences all the nodes in the network concurrently, whereas the other
attacks can affect only one or a few legitimate nodes. The malicious node first impersonates
the PAN coordinator’s ID and uses the same PAN ID as that of the PAN coordinator. The
malicious node manipulates two important parameters: BO and SO as shown in Figure 3.1.
To compete with the beacons from the PAN coordinator, the malicious node sets the BO
less than or equal to that of the PAN coordinator and the SO less than that of the PAN
coordinator. Figure 5.1 shows two different SF sequences. Figure 5.1 (b) has short SF
intervals, as compared to that of the legitimate coordinator (shown in Figure 5.1 (a)), due
to the smaller BO and SO. Thus, when the legitimate nodes process the beacons from both
the PAN coordinator and the malicious node, they synchronize their SF timeslots with the
manipulated BO and SO (e.g., 4 and 2 respectively) if the beacons from the malicious node
arrives immediately after those from the PAN coordinator.
SF 1

SF 2

...

SF n-1

SF n

(a)

Time
SF 1

SF 2

...

SF n-1

SF n

SF n+1

SF n+2

(b)

Time

Figure 5.1. The SFs, (a) and (b), configured by the PAN coordinator and the malicious node
respectively. For example, the BO and SO of (a) are set to 6 and 4 respectively, and the BO
and SO of (b) are set to 4 and 2 respectively.
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5.2.2

DoS of Data Transmission

Impersonating a legitimate node: If a malicious node is in the transmission range
of the PAN coordinator, it is easily able to obtain the IDs of active legitimate nodes in the
PAN. The malicious node also knows whether or not a legitimate node tries to transmit its
sensed data during the CFP by looking at the GTS allocation requests or the beacons. In
this attack, the malicious node impersonates the active legitimate nodes in the PAN and
sends GTS deallocation requests using the legitimate nodes’ IDs to the PAN coordinator.
Figure 5.2 (a) shows an example of this attack. While two legitimate nodes request GTS
allocation to transmit data in the next SF’s CFP, the malicious node can terminate the
data transmissions of the legitimate nodes by sending a GTS deallocation request with
the legitimate nodes’ IDs. Since the PAN coordinator receives the GTS deallocation request
while processing the GTS allocation from the legitimate nodes, it ignores the GTS allocation
coming first and does not assign any GTS to the legitimate nodes. As a result, the legitimate
nodes that do not have any assigned GTS cannot transmit its sensed data.
(Blocked transmissions from legitimate nodes)
…
Time
CAP

CFP

CFP

CAP

CAP

Beacon
Data from legitimate nodes

CFP

CAP

CFP

GTS allocation requests from legitimate nodes
GTS deallocation request from a malicious node

(a) By impersonating a legitimate node

(Blocked transmissions from legitimate nodes)
…

…

Time
CAP

CFP

CAP

CFP

Beacon
Data from legitimate nodes

CAP

CFP

CAP

CFP

Beacon from a malicious node
GTS allocation requests from legitimate nodes

(b) By impersonating the PAN coordinator

Figure 5.2. A malicious node blocking a legitimate node sending data during CFP. (a)
represents that the malicious node pretends to be a legitimate node. (b) represents that the
malicious node pretends to be the PAN coordinator.

Impersonating the PAN coordinator: The previous attack impersonates the legitimate nodes’ IDs to cause the PAN coordinator to deallocate the GTSs. In this attack,
the malicious node impersonates the PAN coordinator and broadcasts manipulated beacons
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that do not include any GTS descriptor. When the legitimate nodes request GTS allocation
to transmit its sensed data, they wait for beacons coming with the GTS descriptors that
tell them the assigned GTS information (e.g., address, slot, and length as shown in Figure
3.2 (c)). If the beacons that the legitimate nodes receive do not have any GTS descriptor,
the nodes assume that they cannot transmit the sensed data to the PAN coordinator due
to no GTS being allocated. Thus, the malicious node impersonating the PAN coordinator
keeps sending a manipulated beacon without GTS descriptors right after the PAN coordinator broadcasts a beacon with GTS descriptors. Since the legitimate nodes just process the
beacon coming last if there are more than one beacon received within the proper boundary
of the timeslot, it is told that no GTS is assigned by the manipulated beacons from the
malicious node coming last and is not transmitting data to the PAN coordinator as shown
in Figure 5.2 (b).
5.2.3

False Data Injection

In this attack, the malicious node identifies which legitimate node has not requested
GTS allocation by looking at the GTS descriptors of beacons. Then, the malicious node
chooses the legitimate node’s ID that does not have any GTS allocation request and sends a
GTS allocation request using that ID. After it confirms that a GTS is allocated by the PAN
coordinator, the malicious node sends false data with the ID to the PAN coordinator during
the CFP while the legitimate node sends its sensed data during the CAP. After checking
the node’s ID, the PAN coordinator regards the false data as time-sensitive ones from the
node due to being sent during the CFP. Then, it can update with the false data sent by
the malicious node. Figure 5.3 shows how this attack works; for instance, when a legitimate
node is transmitting current temperature data during the CAP, the malicious node sends a
GTS allocation request with the spoofed ID, pretends to be another legitimate node, and
can inject false temperature data during the CFP.
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PAN coordinator
...
Temper atur e: 77 °F

Legitimate node

Temper atur e: 77 °F

CAP
SF N

…
Temper atur e: 28 °F

CFP

...
...
Malicious node

Temper atur e: 77 °F

Temper atur e: 77 °F

CAP
SF N+1

…
Temper atur e: 28 °F

CFP

…
Data from a legitim ate node
False data from a malicious node
Received data on PAN coordinator

Figure 5.3. A malicious node sending false temperature to the PAN coordinator.

5.3

Impersonating Non-existing Identities in the PAN
In this category, a malicious node forges up to 7 different IDs depending on the maximum

number of available GTSs. The two attacks presented in this section perform exhaustion
and unfairness attacks by occupying all 7 GTSs and not allowing legitimate nodes to reserve
GTSs.
5.3.1

DoS of GTS Requests

To perform this attack, a malicious node continuously monitors the available GTS
slots with the intent of completely occupying them. Then, the attacker sends several GTS
allocation requests to fill up all the available GTSs in the SF. The advantage of this attack
is that the malicious node can reduce its energy consumption, because once it occupies all
7 GTSs, it does not need to send out any data or commands. The malicious node simply
dissects beacon frames to see if the PAN coordinator performs the preventative action for
the CAP maintenance. Figure 5.4 shows that after legitimate nodes A and B send GTS
deallocation requests, the malicious node completely fills all 7 GTSs with two additional
GTS allocation requests. The goal of this attack is not for the attacker to use the bandwidth
requested, rather it is to prevent the legitimate nodes from transmitting data during the CFP.
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(Total 7 GTS allocation requests)

[GTS REQ: C, 1]

Legitimate node A
2
[GTS REQ: A, 1]

[GTS REQ: D, 1]
1
Malicious node

[GTS REQ: E, 1]
[GTS REQ: F, 1]

PAN coordinator

[GTS REQ: G, 1]

3
[GTS REQ: B, 1]

[GTS REQ: H, 1]

4

[GTS REQ: I, 1]

Legitimate node B

GTS deallocation request from legitimate nodes
GTS allocation request from a malicious node
Broadcasting beacon frames from the PAN coordinator

Figure 5.4. A malicious node filling up all 7 GTSs. 1: the malicious node sends five GTS
allocation requests. 2 and 3: legitimate node A and B send GTS deallocation requests. 4:
the malicious node sends the rest of GTS allocation requests.

5.3.2

Stealing Network Bandwidth

Similar to the DoS of GTS requests, in this attack, an attacker observes the GTS list in
order to eventually occupy the available GTS slots. However, in this attack, the malicious
node sends data at the assigned timeslots. The purpose of data transmission is to prevent
the PAN coordinator from dropping the assigned GTSs. As shown in Figure 5.5, the second
CFP has data transmitted from both legitimate nodes and a malicious node. However, since
legitimate nodes send GTS deallocation requests during the second CAP, the malicious node
sends a GTS allocation request to occupy the new free GTS. Eventually, only the malicious
node sends data during the fourth CFP. The timeslots will never be vacant during the CFP
of every SF, which can cause both exhaustion and unfairness against legitimate nodes. This
also affects the PAN coordinator who cannot go into sleep mode (denial of sleep attack [35])
due to the malicious node continuously sending data.

Figure 5.5. A malicious node stealing all 7 GTSs during CFP.
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Chapter 6

IMPLEMENTATION OF ATTACKS

In this chapter, we introduce the application layer and MAC layer modules that were
implemented to execute the six attacks described in the previous chapter. We explain in
detail how the malicious node runs the attacks in the PAN.

6.1

Attack Modules for Implementation
We have implemented our attacks based on the existing modules provided by Open-ZB.

Given the modules in the MAC layer of the 802.15.4 protocol, we mainly modified the source
code of MAC layer for our attacks and added a malicious application (MAC misbehavior
app) as shown in Figure 6.1. The modified MAC layer and the malicious application target
the vulnerabilities of the GTS management scheme described in Chapter 3.
We have two options for implementing the MAC misbehavior attacks: the first option
is to implement a module in the application layer, while the second option relies on the
implementation of modules in the application and MAC layers. In the application layer
implementation, most operations of the attacks are controlled and executed in MAC misbehavior app. For instance, MAC misbehavior app calls MLME SET() to set existing IDs or
multiple non-existing faked IDs in the malicious node and calls MLME GTS request() in MalGTS management to send GTS (de)allocation requests with manipulated IDs as illustrated
in Figure 6.2. However, since MAC misbehavior app cannot determine the appropriate time
to send GTS (de)allocation requests or manipulated beacons without getting the information
from the MAC layer, it has to either send repeated GTS requests and beacons frequently or
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MAC misbehavior app
Protocol Stack
MAC Layer module
802.15.4-Standard
w/ Beacon-Enabled

Sensor module
for
Temperature,
Humidity and
Light

Others
….

PHY Layer module
802.15.4 -Standard
Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL)
HPLCC2420
module

MSP430
Interrupt

TimerAsync

ADC/I2 C module

Hardware Components on Tmote Sky
CC2420

Clock

Temperature/
Humidity sensor

LEDs

Light sensor

Figure 6.1. The software and hardware modules of the Tmote Sky mote. The software
modules consist of TinyOS v1.15 and the protocol stack of Open-ZB v1.2. The shaded
region represents the modified modules for the malicious node.

get triggered by the MAC layer to send them. Either way has high performance overhead
that can consume the battery of Tmote Sky mote due to high transmission frequency or
increased function calls between the application and MAC layers.

MAC misbehavior app
3. Call MLME_SET.request() with faked IDs
Call MLME_GTS.request()

MAC Interface layer (MCPS SAP / MLME SAP) + Additional parameters
4

2. Signal MLME_BEACON_NOTIFY.indication()

Protocol Stack

MAC Layer
Beacon
management

Mal-GTS
management
5

1. Signal PD_DATA.indication()

PHY Interface layer (PD SAP / PLME SAP)

PHY Layer

Figure 6.2. The attacks implemented and controlled in the application layer.

For this reason, we implement the MAC misbehavior attacks by adding Mal-PD DATA
management in the MAC layer as shown in Figure 6.3. Mal-PD DATA management inter-
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cepts a function, PD DATA.indication(), which indicates all packets (e.g., beacon, command
(GTS request), data) of the communication in the PAN. Then, it directly executes the attacks in the MAC layer. For instance, if the packet is a beacon from the PAN coordinator,
Mal-PD DATA management looks at available GTSs and directly calls Mal-GTS management to fill all remaining GTSs. If the packet is a GTS allocation request from a legitimate
node, Mal-PD DATA management informs Mal-GTS management of the legitimate node’s
ID. Then, Mal-GTS management sends a GTS deallocation request with the ID. This allows
our attacks to be more efficiently executed with lower communication overhead.

MAC misbehavior app
1. Call MLME_SET.request() with faked ID

MAC Interface layer (MCPS SAP / MLME SAP)
3. Signal MLME_BEACON_NOTIFY.indication()
to notify GTS deallocation requested

Protocol Stack

MAC Layer

Mal-GTS
management

4. mal_create_gts_request_cmd()

Mal-PD_DATA
management

5. PD_DATA.request() for GTS deallocation REQ

2. Signal PD_DATA.indication()

PHY Interface layer (PD SAP / PLME SAP)

PHY Layer

Figure 6.3. The attacks improved by implementing and controlling in the MAC layer with
the Mal-PD DATA management module.

6.2

Impersonating Existing Identities in the PAN
In this section, we assume that there is one PAN coordinator, two legitimate nodes (LN2

and LN6), and one malicious node (MN4) as shown in Figures 6.4-6.7. MN4 impersonates
the IDs of LN2, LN6, and the PAN coordinator by eavesdropping on the traffic in the PAN.
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6.2.1

Synchronization Attack

In this attack, MN4 recognizes that the BO is 6 and the SO is 4. Next, it broadcasts
beacons with lower or equal value than the legitimate BO and SO (according to the notation,
0 ≤ SO ≤ BO ≤ 14, in the 802.15.4 standard) until the manipulated beacons lead the node
to synchronize its SF timeslots using the BO and SO (e.g., 4 and 2 respectively) from MN4.
To prevent LN2 from dropping the manipulated beacons, MN4 should be careful to send the
first beacon that could be processed within the boundary of the timeslot when LN2 processes
the beacon from the PAN coordinator. Thus, in the 3rd SF in Figure 6.4, the manipulated
beacon with BO = 4 and SO = 2 is sent right after MN4 receives the legitimate beacon from
the PAN coordinator. LN2 receives the legitimate beacon first and the manipulated beacon
last before finishing the beacon process. Then, LN2 actually synchronizes its SF timeslots
with BO = 4 and SO = 2 in the 3rd SF. From the 3rd SF, LN2 can transmit its sensed data
to MN4 during the CFP that is provided by the MN4’s SFs.
MN4

LN2

PAN
Coordinator

LN6

GTS Allocation REQ [LN2/1, SEQ:0x14]
1st SF

ACK [SEQ: 0x14]

CAP

…

Broadcasting BEACON [BO:6, SO:4]
w/ GTS list [L:1, LN2/1]

BEACON

…

2nd SF
DATA [LN2, SEQ: 0x15, D: 0xA0]
ACK [SEQ: 0x15]

CFP

…

Broadcasting BEACON [BO:6, SO:4]
w/ GTS list [L:1, LN2/1]
Broadcasting BEACON [BO:4, SO:2]
w/ GTS list [L:1, LN2/1]

3rd SF

ACK [SEQ: 0x16]

Figure 6.4. The sequence for synchronization attack.

…

DATA [LN2, SEQ: 0x16,
D: 0xA0]

LN2 resets BO to 4
and SO to 2 when
processing the
beacon received
from MN4

BEACON

CFP

25
6.2.2

DoS of Data Transmission

Impersonating a legitimate node: As shown in Figure 6.5, this attack works through
two SFs. In the first SF, LN2 and LN6 send GTS allocation requests to the PAN coordinator
to reserve one GTS. Then, MN4 immediately sends GTS deallocation requests with the
impersonated LN2 and LN6’s IDs in the same CAP right after their GTS allocation requests.
The PAN coordinator removes LN2 and LN6 from the GTS list and does not receive data
during the CFP of the next SF. Since LN2 and LN6 are not allocated to GTSs, they are not
able to send their messages during the CFP.
MN4

LN2

PAN
Coordinator

LN6

GTS Allocation REQ [LN2/1, SEQ:0x50]
ACK [SEQ: 0x50]
st

GTS Deallocation REQ [LN2/1, SEQ:0x51]

1 SF
ACK [SEQ:0x51]
CAP
GTS Allocation REQ [LN6/1, SEQ: 0x12]
GTS Deallocation REQ [LN6/1, SEQ:0x13]

ACK [SEQ: 0x12]
ACK [SEQ:0x13]

…

No GTS descriptor
adds for LN2 and
LN6

Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:0]
BEACON

2nd SF

…

No GTS is assigned.
LN2 cannot transmit
data

No GTS is assigned.
LN6 cannot transmit
data

CFP

Figure 6.5. The sequence for DoS of data transmission by impersonating a legitimate node.

Impersonating the PAN coordinator: In this attack, MN4 uses the same values of
the BO and SO as the PAN coordinator (obtained by eavesdropping on the normal beacons
in the PAN). However, while LN2 requests GTS allocation and transmits its data at an
assigned GTS, MN4 broadcasts the manipulated beacons without GTS descriptors right
after receiving the beacons from the PAN coordinator in the 3rd SF as shown in Figure
6.6. LN2 processes the manipulated beacon that is received last. Since the beacon does not
include GTS descriptors, LN2 is not able to transmit its sensed data due to no available
GTS assigned.
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MN4

LN2

PAN
Coordinator

LN6

GTS Allocation REQ [LN2/1, SEQ:0x14]
1st SF

ACK [SEQ: 0x14]

CAP

…

Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:1, LN2/1]
BEACON

…

2nd SF
DATA [LN2, SEQ: 0x15, D: 0xA0]
ACK [SEQ: 0x15]

CFP

…

Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:1, LN2/1]

Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:0]

3rd SF

No DATA transmitting

…

LN2 knows that no
GTS is allocated
when processing the
beacon from MN4

BEACON

CFP

Figure 6.6. The sequence for DoS of data transmission by impersonating the PAN
coordinator.

6.2.3

False Data Injection

Unlike DoS of data transmission, this attack exploits GTS allocation requests to transmit false data. Figure 6.7 shows such a case where LN2 has already been assigned to one
GTS. In this case, MN4 starts after LN2 sends a GTS deallocation request in the first SF.
Then, the PAN coordinator removes LN2’s ID on the GTS list of the next beacon. Since
MN4 is aware that LN2 is not in the GTS list, it immediately tries to get one GTS by
sending a GTS allocation request with LN2’s ID. Once MN4 successfully takes the GTS, it
starts sending false data with LN2’s ID in the third SF.

6.3

Impersonating Non-existing Identities in the PAN
For forging non-existing IDs, we also have one PAN coordinator, two legitimate nodes

(LN2 and LN6), and one malicious node (MN4) that generates false IDs that are different
from LN2 and LN6. In this case, MN4 eavesdrops on the beacons to learn what IDs do not
belong in the PAN.

27

MN4

Previous
SF

LN2

PAN
Coordinator

LN6

DATA [LN2, SEQ: 0x12, D: 0xA0]

CFP

GTS Deallocation REQ [LN2/1, SEQ:0x13]
ACK [SEQ: 0x13]

CAP

…

ACK [SEQ: 0x12]

1st SF

…

Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:1, LN6/1]
BEACON

MN4 knows that
LN2 is not on the GTS list now.

…

GTS Allocation REQ [LN2/1, SEQ:0x14]
ACK [SEQ:0x14]

CAP

…

2nd SF
Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:2, LN6/1, LN2/1]

BEACON

…

DATA [LN2, SEQ:0x15, D: 0x10]
3rd

SF

ACK [SEQ:0x15]
CFP
PAN coordinator
indicates
that an updated data,
0x10, is sent from LN2

Figure 6.7. The sequence for false data injection.

6.3.1

DoS of GTS Requests

As shown in Figure 6.8, this attack needs several SFs to allow MN4 to fill all 7 GTSs.
In each SF, MN4 knows how many GTSs are available and sends GTS allocation requests in
order to reserve the remaining slots of GTSs. Once MN4 takes all 7 GTSs, it stops sending
GTS allocation requests to reduce its energy consumption. It then monitors the beacons to
see if the PAN coordinator drops the unused GTSs by a preventative action for the CAP
maintenance. If this occurs, MN4 will start sending GTS allocation requests again.
6.3.2

Stealing Network Bandwidth

Figure 6.9 shows that a malicious node takes the last slot out of 7 GTSs, 6 slots of which
were already assigned to the malicious node. Then, it can consume all 7 GTSs during the
CFP to transmit data. The difference from the previous DoS of GTS Requests is that since
this attack continues to transmit data at each timeslot of the CFP, the PAN coordinator
will not take any preventative action for the CAP maintenance.
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MN4

LN2

PAN
Coordinator
Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:2, LN2/1, LN6/1]
LN6

BEACON

MN4 knows that
5 slots are available now.

1st SF

…

…

GTS Allocation REQ [LN3/1, SEQ:0x10]
5 GTS
Allocation
GTS Allocation REQ [LN7/1, SEQ:0x50]
REQs

ACK [SEQ: 0x50]
2nd

GTS Deallocation REQ [LN2/1, SEQ:0x13]
ACK [SEQ: 0x13]

SF

CAP

…

Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:6, LN6/1, LN3/1, LN4/1, LN5/1, LN6/1, LN7/1]
BEACON

MN4 knows that 1 slot is available now
because of LN2 deallocated.

…

GTS Allocation REQ [LN8/1, SEQ:0x60]
1 GTS
Allocation
REQ

ACK [SEQ: 0x60]
GTS Deallocation REQ [LN6/1, SEQ: 0x12]

3rd SF

CAP

ACK [SEQ: 0x12]

…

Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:6, LN3/1, LN4/1, LN5/1, LN6/1, LN7/1, LN8/1]

BEACON

MN4 knows that another 1 slot is available now
because of LN6 deallocated.

…

1 GTS
GTS Allocation REQ [LN9/1, SEQ:0x70]
Allocation
REQ

ACK [SEQ: 0x70]

CAP

…

Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:7, LN3/1,
LN4/1, LN5/1, LN6/1, LN7/1, LN8/1, LN9/1]

4th SF

BEACON

Figure 6.8. The sequence for DoS of GTS requests.

MN4

LN2

PAN
Coordinator

LN6

Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:2, LN2/1, LN6/1]
1st SF

BEACON

MN4 knows that
5 slots are available now.

…

DATA [LN2, SEQ:0x13, D:0xA0]
ACK [SEQ: 0x13]

2nd SF

DATA [LN6, SEQ:0x61, D:0x23]
ACK [SEQ: 0x61]

CFP

…

GTS Deallocation REQ [LN2/1, SEQ:0x14]
ACK [SEQ: 0x14]

When any legitimate node leaves GTS list,
Sybil node will fill the list and send data

CAP

…

3rd SF
Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:1, LN6/1]

BEACON

GTS Allocation REQ [LN3/1, SEQ:0x60]

ACK [SEQ: 0x60]

4th SF

CAP

…

Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:2, LN6/1, LN3/1]

BEACON

DATA [LN3, SEQ:0x15, D: 0x10]
ACK [SEQ:0x15]

CFP

Figure 6.9. The sequence for stealing network bandwidth.
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Chapter 7

ATTACK ANALYSIS

We have verified our implementation with the TI packet sniffer [31] to monitor the
packet transmission while each attack is running. We employ the PAN coordinator to log
humidity and temperature data sent by a legitimate node during both the CAP and the CFP.
The throughput given in Figures 7.1, 7.2, and 7.4 are based on the total number of data in
bytes divided by the elapsed time. The total data is counted only during the CFP. For each
of the six attacks, we measured the packet transmission for 80 to 400 seconds depending on
the complexity of each attack.

7.1

Synchronization attack
Figure 7.1 shows that LN2 synchronizes its SFs with the legitimate PAN coordinator

broadcasting beacons (BO = 6, SO = 3) at first. However, it resynchronizes the SFs with
MN4’s beacons (BO = 4, SO = 2) around the 24-second mark. Figure 7.1 (a) illustrates
that while the data throughput of LN2 is increasing up to 15 bps, MN4 starts broadcasting
malicious beacons with BO (4) and SO (2) whereas the PAN coordinator broadcasts beacons
with BO (6) and SO (3). At this moment, the MN4’s data throughput starts increasing
whereas the throughput to the PAN coordinator begins to decrease. The reason for lower
data throughput from the 24-second mark is that the additional beacons from the PAN
coordinator are still being sent within the shorter SFs of MN4, and LN2 transmits only 2
bytes in the SFs whereas it was previously sending more than 4 bytes in the SFs of the PAN
coordinator. We can differentiate where the data is being transmitted from by checking the

30
intervals between the first beacons and the first data packets in SFs. We measure the normal
intervals in two different SFs. In one SF set by BO (6) and SO (3), the interval between
the first beacon and the data packet is about 250 ms as shown in Figure 7.1 (b). In the
other SF set by BO (4) and SO (2) of beacons, the interval is about 69 ms. Figure 7.1
(b) shows that the interval in the synchronization attack is reduced from about 250 ms to
about 69 ms around the 24-second mark, which is the same time mark that MN4 begins to
broadcast its fake beacons. As a result, LN2 perfectly synchronized the beacons with MN4
and transmitted data to MN4.
(a) Data throughput changes by synchronization attack
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Figure 7.1. Legitimate node (LN2) data throughput changes after synchronizing with
beacons from MN4. The intervals are between the first beacon and the first data packet in
SFs.

7.2

DoS of Data Transmission

Impersonating a legitimate node: Figure 7.2 (a) shows the decline of data throughput
on LN2 and LN6 while MN4 is sending GTS deallocation requests with LN2 and LN6’s IDs.
Around the 50-second mark of the experiment, MN4 sends two GTS deallocation requests
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back to back. It also sends the same two GTS deallocation requests whenever it receives a
beacon-notification. Therefore, the data throughputs from LN2 and LN6 during the CFP
drops to 0bps. Immediately after the 50-second mark, even though LN2 and LN6 try to send
GTS allocation requests, the requests cannot be processed due to MN4 continuously sending
GTS deallocation requests. By modifying the MAC layer (as discussed in Section 6.1), MN4
only sends GTS deallocation requests right after LN2 requests GTS allocation (around the
52-second mark and the 85-second mark in Figure 7.2 (b)). This reduces the transmission
frequency of MN4 substantially. However, since the PAN coordinator only processes the last
GTS deallocation request, this leads to the same result of blocking data transmission (no
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(b) (a)’s improvement by MAC layer modification
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data transmission from the 50-second mark in Figure 7.2 (a) and (b)).
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Figure 7.2. Legitimate nodes (LN2 and LN6) data throughput during CFP by a malicious
node (MN4). LN2 DAT and LN6 DAT: Data from LN2 and LN6 and MN4 GTS: GTS
deallocation requests from MN4.

Impersonating the PAN coordinator: Figure 7.2 (c) shows that MN4 starts sending the
same beacons without GTS descriptors (i.e., no GTS assigned) around the 27-second mark,
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which immediately cripples LN2’s throughput. Even though LN2 takes GTS information
with the PAN coordinator in few SFs from 34-second to 36-second and transmits some data,
it processes only the manipulated beacons from MN4 after around the 37-second mark.
Thus, LN2 does not transmit its sensed data (no data transmission from the 37-second
mark) because it assumes that no GTS is available due to the manipulated beacons without
GTS descriptors. By impersonating the PAN coordinator, we produce the same blocking of
data transmission as that shown in Figure 7.2 (a), (b), and (c).

7.3

False Data Injection
Figure 7.3 shows the change of humidity and temperature from LN2. We tested this

attack inside a building, where the humidity and temperature conditions were approximately
41% and 72◦ F respectively. However, since MN4 impersonating LN2 sends false data readings
of 90% for the humidity and 28◦ F for the temperature during the CFP, this results in
fluctuations of the sensed data reported for 20 seconds around the 73 to 93-second mark.
Since 28◦ F is below the freezing point, the false data of temperature might lead to a warning
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Figure 7.3. Fluctuation of humidity and temperature.
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7.4

DoS of GTS Requests
Figure 7.4 (a) shows two instances of the DoS GTS Request attack. LN2 and MN4 start

at the same time (around the 20-second mark). By sending a GTS request, LN2 quickly
occupies one GTS and transmits data during the CFP. Similarly, MN4 quickly occupies the
remaining 6 of the 7 GTSs. While LN2 is transmitting data, MN4 continuously sends GTS
allocation requests in an attempt to occupy the last GTS. Once LN2 releases its GTS at
the 50-second mark, the coordinator allows MN4 to occupy the last GTS. MN4 now stops
sending GTS allocation requests to conserve energy. LN2 sends a GTS allocation request
around the 60-second mark and the 90-second mark, but the coordinator does not assign
LN2 a GTS (because MN4 has them all). To see another iteration of this, we turn off the
PAN coordinator around the 130-second mark to force it to perform the preventative CAP
maintenance action manually (this is because the IEEE 802.15.4 source code from the OpenZB does not handle this situation as it should). Accordingly, the PAN coordinator does not
have any requested GTSs. Around the 140-second mark, we turn on the PAN coordinator
and LN2 successfully is allocated one GTS and it transmits data during the corresponding
CFP for about 70 seconds. MN4 now begins sending GTS allocation requests between the
150-second mark and 200-second mark and is able to occupy 6 GTSs. Also, when LN2
releases its GTS around the 200-second mark, MN4 immediately occupies all 7 GTSs again.

7.5

Stealing Network Bandwidth
Figure 7.4 (b) shows the data throughputs of LN2 and MN4 and the GTS allocation

requests of MN4. While LN2 has one GTS and transmits data during the CFP, MN4 starts
sending GTS allocation requests with 7 forged IDs around 20-second mark and transmits
data at the assigned GTSs. One of 7 GTS allocation requests of MN4 is discarded at the
first attempt because one GTS is already assigned to LN2. However, as soon as LN2 releases
its GTS around the 50-second mark, MN4 occupies the last GTS immediately and has all
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(a) DoS of GTS Requests
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Figure 7.4. A malicious node (MN4) filling up all 7 GTSs. LN2 DAT: LN2 Data, LN2 GTS
AL: LN2 GTS allocation request, LN2 GTS DE: LN2 GTS deallocation request, and MN4
GTS AL: GTS allocation requests from MN4. A malicious node (MN4) stealing GTSs during
CFP. LN2 DAT and MN4 DAT: Data from LN2 and MN4 respectively and MN4 GTS: GTS
allocation requests from MN4.

7 GTSs. As a result, LN2 and the PAN coordinator will use a lot of energy because LN2
continues to send GTS allocation requests to secure a GTS, and the PAN coordinator will
continue to receive the illegitimate data from MN4.

35

Chapter 8

SECURING BEACON-ENABLED 802.15.4

In this chapter, we discuss which security requirements are necessary to defend against
attacks on beacon-enabled 802.15.4 networks. As we demonstrated, attacks can be conducted
by impersonating both the PAN coordinator and legitimate regular nodes. The legitimate
regular nodes trusted forged beacons from a malicious node masquerading as the PAN coordinator (e.g., synchronization attack and DoS of data transmission by impersonating the PAN
coordinator). The PAN coordinator also trusted forged data and control (GTS (de)allocation
requests) packets from malicious nodes masquerading as legitimate regular nodes (e.g., DoS
of data transmission by impersonating a legitimate node, DoS of GTS requests, false data
injection, and stealing network bandwidth).
To address the aforementioned attacks, we propose an enhanced MiniSec [9], called
beacon-enabled MiniSec (BCN-MiniSec), which satisfies the security requirements shown in
Table 8.1. BCN-MiniSec can guarantee unicast authentication and broadcast authentication
together in the beacon-enabled 802.15.4 network. Unicast authentication is used for the PAN
coordinator to verify data and control messages. Given that MiniSec has low communication
cost for unicast data message authentication, we couple the techniques used by MiniSec with
lightweight authentication for unicast control messages in 802.15.4 beacon-enabled mode.
With unicast data message authentication, BCN-MiniSec can prevent a malicious node from
transmitting forged data messages. Since forged data messages are sent particularly at GTSs
for false data injection, it is also possible that BCN-MiniSec verifies control messages (GTS
allocation requests) for indirect defense beforehand. Primarily, BCN-MiniSec adopts unicast
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control message authentication to defend against DoS of data transmission by impersonating
a legitimate node, DoS of GTS requests, and stealing network bandwidth that exploit forged
GTS (de)allocation requests. Further, we add broadcast authentication to secure the PAN
coordinator’s broadcast messages. BCN-MiniSec adopts a one-way key chain for broadcast
authentication as done in other works [17] [36] and discloses a key of the key chain immediately with the beacons for real-time communications in the beacon-enabled 802.15.4 network.
We explain each security requirement below to show how the individual requirement works
in the beacon-enabled 802.15.4 network and can defend against the attacks.

Table 8.1. Security requirements to counter the attacks.
Security requirements
Attacks
Broadcast authentication
Synchronization attack

Y

N

Impersonating a legitimate node

N

Y

Impersonating the
PAN coordinator

Y

N

False data injection

N

Y

DoS of GTS requests

N

Y

Stealing network bandwidth

N

Y

DoS of data
transmission

8.1

Unicast authentication

Unicast control message authentication
In several of our attacks, a malicious node is able to send GTS (de)allocation requests

with forged IDs. This is possible because the PAN coordinator does not sufficiently authenticate control messages (GTS requests). To prevent these attacks, unicast command frames
should be authenticated properly with a message authentication code (MAC) using a keyed
cryptographic hash function by the PAN coordinator. While BCN-MiniSec keeps MiniSec’s
offset codebook (OCB) [37] to generates MACs and counters for unicast data messages,
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BCN-MiniSec instead adopts a cipher block chaining MAC (CBC-MAC) with the advanced
encryption standard (AES) to provide authentication with a 4-byte MAC and 1-byte initialization vector for unicast control messages. A number of MAC algorithms have been
proposed and adopted in many other communication protocols for lightweight authentication. One of them is the CBC-MAC that uses a block cipher to obtain a MAC for messages.
Since the CBC-MAC is able to process arbitrary length messages due to the block chaining
method and has reasonable performance for authentication with AES (due to a minimum
number of cipher function calls [38]), it is sufficient for authentication of unicast control
messages. The steps for applying AES-CBC-MAC are as follows:
Key setup and nonce: Each legitimate node has its own secret key shared with the
PAN coordinator (KLN i , where i is {1, 2, ..., n}, the index of each legitimate node (LN) in
the PAN) before the nodes are deployed. For the nonce (that provides semantic security
and freshness), legitimate nodes also have their own initialization vectors (IVs) that can be
exposed either explicitly or implicitly (e.g., only part of the IV exposed) with the control
messages to the PAN coordinator. For instance, LN i has IVLN i−t , where t is a sequence of
packets increasing in a timely fashion.
Transmitting control messages: Each legitimate node constructs its control messages
and transmits them as follows:
LN →P AN COR : CM Dt
= M HRt , M SDUt , IVLN i−t ,
M AC(KLN i , M HRt |M SDUt | IVLN i−t |Lt )
Where LN stands for legitimate node, P AN COR stands for the PAN coordinator, and L
represents the length of the packet. CM Di is a command frame as shown in Figure 8.1 (b† ).
M HRt represents MAC header and M SDUt represents MAC service data unit as shown in
Figure 8.1.
Verifying control messages: The PAN coordinator decodes the MAC with KLN i of LN i
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and gets M HRt and IVLN i−t . Then, it checks the integrity of M HRt and M SDUt and
authenticates LN i by KLN i . It also confirms the packet’s freshness with IVLN i−t .
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Figure 8.1. The packet formats of the 802.15.4 MAC with “no security” in (a) and (b) and
BCN-MiniSec in (a† ) and (b† ). In (a† ), Key disclosure represents a disclosed key in one-way
key chains. IV is an initialization vector. The shaded regions represent authenticated fields.

8.2

Broadcast authentication
BCN-MiniSec also provides broadcast authentication for beacons in the beacon-enabled

802.15.4 network. While unicast authentication can provide the PAN coordinator with the
trust of command and data frames that are transmitted from legitimate regular nodes, broadcast authentication is an efficient way to ensure the authenticity of the PAN coordinator’s
beacon broadcasts. Unlike unicast command and data frames sent by regular nodes to a
single entity (i.e., the PAN coordinator), beacon frames are broadcast to all nodes in the
PAN. During broadcasts, the nodes share the same key as the PAN coordinator in a similar
fashion to unicast authentication. However, if this key is not dynamic, any legitimate node
can masquerade as the PAN coordinator. For this reason, BCN-MiniSec uses one-way key
chains [39] that use a one-way function to generate a sequence of keys. Many techniques
similar to one-way key chains have been proposed for many cryptographic applications and
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particularly for broadcast authentication [17] [36]. The one-way key chains are generated
by the PAN coordinator only, and the last key of the key chain is shared between the PAN
coordinator and the regular nodes. Then, the PAN coordinator discloses the previous key in
the key chain whenever it broadcasts beacons (i.e., one key per broadcast). The nodes can
then authenticate the beacons.
Key setup: The PAN coordinator generates a key chain (K0 , K1 , K2 , ..., Kn−1 , Kn ) from
K0 by using a cryptographic hash function F . Thus, Kn = F ( Kn−1 ), where n is the maximum number of keys (new keying material would be exchanged prior to n = 1 to continue
the secure communications). Then, Kn (i.e., the last key) is pre-shared between the PAN
coordinator and the nodes before they are deployed. Kn is used to secure the first beacon.
Then, the next to the last key (Kn−1 ) is used with the second beacon. The pattern continues
and the PAN coordinator traverses the chain backwards, using the previous key in the chain
for the next transmission. The key expires after each transmission and the function that
generates the key is one way so nodes cannot masquerade as the PAN coordinator.
Broadcast beacons: The PAN coordinator sends beacons as follows:
LN ←P AN COR : BCNn−1
= M HRn−1 , Kn−1 , M SDUn−1 ,
M AC(Kn−1 , M HRn−1 | Kn−1 | M SDUn−1 )
Where n − 1 is a sequence of the key chain and n is decremented by 1 after each transmission
while n > 0. BCNn−1 is a beacon as shown in Figure 8.1 (a† ).
Verifying beacon: The nodes verify Kn−1 by using the hash function F . Kn = F ( Kn−1 ),
where Kn is already verified in the previous beacon or trusted in the case of the initial key
disclosed pre-deployment. That is, the nodes receive the previous key in the chain and
assume that it is valid if its hash is the current key. Thus, using one-way key chains enables
the PAN coordinator to efficiently provide authentication to its beacon broadcasts.
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8.3

BCN-MiniSec Communication Costs
In this section, we estimate the additional communication cost of BCN-MiniSec. Figure

8.1 (a) and (b) show beacon and command frames of the 802.15.4 standard. Figure 8.1 (a† )
and (b† ) illustrate the frames using BCN-MiniSec to show the modified fields and the frame
length. BCN-MiniSec adds Key Disclosure and MAC fields to regular beacons for broadcast authentication and IV and MAC fields to regular command frames for unicast control
message authentication. In addition, BCN-MiniSec uses the same packet format for unicast
data message authentication as that used by MiniSec.
Table 8.2 shows a summary of the communication costs of our countermeasure, BCNMiniSec, with its viability. In the table, we present the packet sizes (M HR, M SDU, M F R)
from our experiments (beacon frames, GTS command frames, and data frames). “No security” shows the packet sizes for each without any security applied and we compare the
increased overhead (communication cost) and viability of MiniSec, BCN-MiniSec, and “No
security.” In beacon-enabled 802.15.4 networks, BCN-MiniSec can prevent the synchronization attack and DoS of data transmission by impersonating the PAN coordinator with 31.6%
overhead whereas MiniSec is not viable. Moreover, BCN-MiniSec requires 25% overhead to
secure unicast control messages (GTS (de)allocation requests) whereas MiniSec is not viable.
For unicast data message authentication, BCN-MiniSec requires the same 12.5% overhead
as that of MiniSec since BCN-MiniSec uses the same techniques for data message authentication as those used by MiniSec. Thus, BCN-MiniSec is viable to defend against attacks
on the beacon-enabled 802.15.4 MAC with reasonable overhead. It must be noted that the
storage costs for the hash chain for broadcast authentication and keying material for unicast
authentication have not been considered.

Table 8.2. The viability and communication cost of BCN-MiniSec.

1

MAC is message authentication code in this table.
Communication cost (B)

Attacks

Synchronization attack
DoS of data transmission
-. Impersonating the PAN
coordinator

DoS of data transmission
-. Impersonating a legitimate node
DoS of GTS requests
Stealing network bandwidth

False data injection

Security

Viability
MHR

MSDU

MFR
(+MAC1 )

Security
overhead

Total

Increase over
no security

No security
(beacon)

N

10

26

2

-

38

-
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N

-

-

-

-

-

-

BCN-MiniSec

Y

10
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4
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50
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N

8

2

2

-

12

-

MiniSec

N

-

-

-

-

-

-
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Y

8

3

4

3

15

25%
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N
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-

16
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Y
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4
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18
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Y

12

2

4

2

18
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Chapter 9

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

In this thesis, we first described the existing vulnerabilities of the beacon broadcast
and the GTS management scheme in the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. We also investigated
security protocols proposed in recent years and security mechanisms adopted in the standard.
However, to date, no method comprehensively addresses the weakness of the beacon-enabled
802.15.4 MAC. To demonstrate the vulnerabilities in the 802.15.4 MAC, we implemented
six attacks: (1) Synchronization attack, (2) DoS of data transmission by impersonating a
legitimate node, (3) DoS of data transmission by impersonating the PAN coordinator, (4)
False data injection, (5) DoS of GTS requests, and (6) Stealing network bandwidth. We also
analyzed the results for each attack and designed a countermeasure, BCN-MiniSec. Future
work will provide a detailed energy measurement of our attacks.
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